Tie identity to the action before it goes through
Confirm who is really on the call and validate the instruction in the same step, whether that is a wire, a vendor banking change, an executive approval, or a new hire's access.
From signals to one action your team can take.
- UnconfirmedIdentityCaller does not resolve to the contact on the account
- New beneficiaryInstructionDestination account has no payment history with you
- New domainChannelRequest arrived from a domain first seen this week
- Out of policyPolicyCallback to the number of record was not completed
Hold the instruction. Money and access wait for a second check before either moves.
How verification runs
Diopter checks the request against records you already maintain. It advises the approver rather than sitting inline as a payment gate.
- 1
Resolve the caller
Signals about who is on the call are compared against the contact attached to the account, so a plausible caller who does not match the record is visible before anything is acted on.
Identity signals vs contact of record
- 2
Read the instruction
The specifics of what is being asked are extracted from the conversation: destination account, amount, beneficiary, and what is being changed.
Amount · beneficiary · what changed
- 3
Validate the bank details
The beneficiary's banking information is validated through proprietary data systems Diopter holds access to, so the account itself is checked rather than only compared against what you already had on file.
Proprietary beneficiary data · not customer-supplied only
- 4
Check the control path
Whether your own required steps happened at all: dual approval, the callback to the number on record, and the threshold that applies at this amount.
Advisory verdict · routed to the approver
Step 4 in practice · the number in the thread is refused, the number of record is called
Where verification breaks down
- 01
Unverified callers on high-stakes calls
Approvals, payments, and access granted on the strength of a familiar voice or face, with no second check on who is really there.
- 02
Last-minute instruction changes
Payment details or access requests changed under urgency, often from a brand-new email domain or a freshly ported number.
- 03
Identity gaps in onboarding
A new hire or vendor contact whose identity was never tied to the access or payments they are granted.
How an identity and payment attack unfolds
These attacks move through a recognizable sequence. Diopter scores that sequence while the call is still in progress.
A trusted identity is claimed
The caller presents as an executive, a vendor, or a verified person the team already knows.
Pressure shortens the check
Urgency makes a second verification step feel like an obstacle rather than a control.
The request goes off-policy
The ask routes around the normal approval path, a new channel, a new contact, a new account.
The change escalates
A detail update becomes a payment, an access grant, or an onboarding step.
Money or access moves
The instruction is executed before identity was ever tied to the action.
Wherever the instruction matters more than the sender.
This capability applies to the moment an action is taken, whether the risk on the call was synthetic or entirely human.
Onboarding and access
Confirming a new hire is the person who interviewed, before payroll and system access are granted.
Outbound transfers
The destination account checked against your record of where this counterparty has actually been paid before.
Standing record changes
A banking-detail update on a vendor master, which quietly redirects every payment after it, not just one.
Approvals and exceptions
Whether the person granting an exception is someone your policy actually lets grant it.
Detection tells you the call was fake. This tells you the money was wrong.
Synthetic media is one way a bad instruction gets through, and not the most common one. Plenty of fraudulent payments are authorized by an entirely real person who was themselves deceived, and no media check will ever flag that call. What flags it is the instruction. Diopter validates the beneficiary's banking details through proprietary data systems rather than only checking them against the file you already have, which is the difference between confirming your own records and confirming the account.
Verifying a face or voice once is not enough. Diopter ties identity to the instruction and the conversation around it.
What verification does not claim
The first point is the one to settle internally before a pilot, because it determines who owns the decision.
It advises, it does not block
Diopter raises a verdict and routes it to an approver. It does not sit inline in your payment rails and will not stop a transfer on its own, so nothing breaks if it is wrong.
A genuinely new counterparty looks new
A first legitimate payment to a real new vendor has no history to check against, so it reads as unverified by design. That is a prompt to complete your callback, not an accusation.
It is not a replacement for your IdP
This is a check at the moment of the call, layered on top of the identity provider and payment controls you already run. It does not manage identities or hold the system of record.
Light to deploy, clear about what runs where.
Pilot in days, roll wider through MDM, and keep sensitive call media inside your perimeter.
- On-prem and hybrid deployments supported
- No caller-side install
- Bot or bot-free capture
- Configurable retention, including ZDR
- MDM rollout (Intune, Jamf)
- SOC 2 Type II in progress
Walk an attack arc with Diopter.
We will replay a real incident, show the signals Diopter scored, and map the verdict your team would act on. We will sign your NDA first if you want one.