Real-time social engineering defense for healthcare
Diopter helps your health system stop social engineering on the calls where access and money move, from IT help desk resets to supplier bank changes. We test your teams with simulated attacks, then assist them on their own calls with real-time alerts before access is reset or a payment changes.
A free simulated attack on a team you choose, with an NDA first if you want one.

What can Diopter help healthcare teams do on calls?
Reset access for the right clinician.
A "physician" locked out before a shift might ask the help desk to reset multi-factor authentication (MFA) on a new phone.
Keep payer and supplier payments going to the right account.
A "revenue cycle manager" or a supplier might ask to change bank details for incoming or outgoing payments.
Protect payroll and direct deposit.
A caller posing as staff could get a reset, then change where a salary is paid.
Hold urgent payment requests from executives.
A cloned "CFO" or "chief medical officer" on a video call might push for an urgent payment.
Prove your controls to auditors and regulators.
If they ask how you verify callers before resets and payment changes, simulation results and the evidence trail from live calls can help you answer.
How does Diopter help stop healthcare social engineering on a live call?
Identity
Whether the caller and the request match your records, such as the number on file, the supplier's known contact, or the staff member's normal access
MismatchVoice and video
Cloned or text-to-speech voices, plus face-swap and lip-sync artifacts on video, scored for the whole call
SyntheticConversation
Pressure such as a "physician" who's about to see patients and wants the code sent to a new number
PatternPolicy
An MFA reset, a bank change, or a payment approved on the same call it was asked for, checked against your policy
Out of policyThe person on the call sees the alert, the reason, and a suggested next step, such as a callback to the number on file. A person decides with the evidence in front of them, and your security team gets the same evidence.
Which social engineering attacks have hit healthcare organizations?
In April 2024, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) warned that callers were targeting IT help desks in the health sector. They posed as revenue cycle and administrative staff, called from local area codes, and passed identity checks with real employee details. They said their phone was broken and got a new device enrolled for MFA, then changed payment details so payer payments went to attacker-controlled bank accounts.1
In December 2025, Binary Defense investigated a case where an attacker posing as a physician called a healthcare organization's IT help desk, saying they were locked out and had patients to see right now. The help desk reset the password and MFA token, allowing the attacker to change the physician's direct deposit details. The organization found out when the physician asked why they hadn't been paid, The Register reported.2
In August 2026, Health-ISAC published a playbook describing attackers who pose as locked-out physicians and executives by phone, text, and collaboration apps, using urgency around patient care to get password resets and new MFA devices. The playbook said attackers were using generative AI voice mimicry to sound like staff, Paubox reported.3
These attacks follow the same pattern:
The caller knows the right names, roles, and details, often from public profiles or an earlier breach.
There's a reason the request can't wait, like patients waiting, a broken phone, or a payment run.
The ask skips the normal process, such as a new MFA device, new bank details, or "just text me the code."
Access or money moves, and nobody notices until a payment or a paycheck goes missing.
Why are healthcare organizations a target for social engineering?
How do social engineering simulations work for healthcare teams?
We'll run simulated help desk resets and bank change calls built from real healthcare cases
You'll receive results by team and by step, so you know which teams to fix first
The same scenarios then become the checks Diopter runs on live calls
How does Diopter roll out for a security team?
- OpenTelemetry native: logs flow into your SIEM, and EDR and MDR connect via API
- Runs on Zoom, Microsoft Teams, Google Meet, and phone lines (Dialpad, RingCentral, and any carrier via API), with Webex coming soon
- Captures calls with or without a bot, with nothing to install on the caller's side
- Rolls out through MDM (Intune, Jamf)
- Offers configurable data retention, including zero retention, and on-prem or hybrid deployments
- Has completed a SOC 2 Type II audit
Two ways to start
Your first agentic attack is on us. Fill out the form, and we'll talk through how to run a simulated help desk call on one of your teams. Want to talk about live-call defense instead? Book a walkthrough, and we'll replay a cloned-clinician call into a help desk and show you what Diopter caught and when.
Common questions for security and finance teams
Can Diopter test our health system with a simulated attack first?
Yes. Diopter will run one simulated attack on one of your teams at no cost, such as a "clinician" calling your help desk for an MFA reset, using a cloned voice if you'd like. Most teams start there, then turn on the same scenarios for live calls.
How do hospitals stop social engineering on the IT help desk?
Diopter helps the help desk agent while the call is live. It scores the caller's voice for cloning and the conversation for pressure, checks the reset request against your policy, and shows the agent a real-time alert with a suggested next step, usually a callback to the number on file.
Can deepfake detection for healthcare catch a cloned doctor's voice?
Yes. Diopter scores the voice through the whole call, so a clone gets flagged whether it shows up in the first second or only when the access request comes up. The help desk agent sees a real-time alert with the reason while the caller is still on the line.
Does deepfake detection for healthcare work on phone calls as well as video?
Yes. Diopter covers video meetings and phone calls, where most help desk, AP, and billing calls happen. On VoIP and phone lines, through Dialpad, RingCentral, or any carrier via API, it scores the voice for cloning and the conversation for pressure.
Can Diopter catch a fake supplier or payer changing bank details?
Yes. Diopter checks the call that confirms the change and flags signs such as a voice that doesn't match, pressure to skip the callback, or a bank change your policy says needs a second step.
Will Diopter slow down clinicians who are locked out?
No. Diopter only alerts when the whole pattern is there, so a locked-out clinician would still get reset at the usual speed. One urgent sentence won't trigger an alert. Diopter needs to see a mismatched voice, pressure to skip verification, and an out-of-policy request together.
What should a healthcare organization look for in social engineering defense?
Start with your own process. A callback to a number already on file and a second approver for password resets, MFA changes, payroll changes, and supplier bank changes can stop many of these attacks without any tool. When you compare tools, run each one on your own help desk and accounts payable calls during a pilot and measure how often it raises a false alarm, how fast the alert reaches the person on the call, and what it does with recordings and patient or staff data. Check that it covers the channels your teams use and fits your existing security tools. The final decision should stay with a person, and the tool shouldn't slow down patient care. Your own pilot will tell you more than any vendor's benchmark, ours included.
Research behind deepfake detection for healthcare
- US Department of Health and Human Services, Health Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center (HC3), Sector Alert, Apr 3, 2024: social engineering attacks targeting IT help desks in the health sector.
- The Register, Feb 11, 2026, on Binary Defense ARC Labs' December 2025 investigation.
- Paubox, Aug 20, 2026, on Health-ISAC's Aug 17, 2026 post "Threat Actor Playbook: Conversational Social Engineering in Care Settings".
- FBI public service announcement I-120324-PSA, Dec 3, 2024.